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Abstract
This paper constructs a simple, overlapping generations version of
an R&D-based growth model a la Diamond (1965) and Jones (1995),
and examines how an increase in old-age survival probability impacts
purposeful R&D investment and long-run growth by aecting fertility
and education decisions. We demonstrate that under certain condi-
tions, old-age survival probability, when relatively low (high), posi-
tively (negatively) aect economic growth. This study also compares
the growth implications of child education subsidies and child rearing
subsidies and demonstrates that although child education subsidies
always foster economic growth, child rearing subsidies may negatively
impact economic growth in particular situations. Finally, we briey
consider the eects of a child education subsidy on welfare levels.
Keywords: R&D, Fertility, Human Capital, Child Education Subsidy, Child
Rearing Subsidy.
JEL classication: J13, J24, O10, O30, O40
We are grateful for helpful comments from O. Galor, T. Hori, Y. Ono, and participants
of seminar held at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) of the Cabinet
Oce of the Government of Japan. All remaining errors are our own. This project
was conducted during second author's visit in Brown University, whose hospitality is
gratefully acknowledged. The second author also acknowledge the nancial support from
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan under the
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B):(No.25870954)
yCorresponding author. Address: Graduate School of Economics, Kobe Uni-
versity, Rokko-dai 2-1, Kobe 657-8501, Japan; Fax: +81 78 803 7293, E-mail:
hashimoto@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp
zAddress: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, 1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-
cho, Nishinomiya 662-8501, Hyogo, Japan; E-mail:tabataken@kwansei.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
During the previous several decades, substantial demographic changes have
been taken place in industrialized countries. Table 1 depicts the observed
changes in the total fertility rate (TFR), life expectancy at birth, and popu-
lation growth rate among the G7 countries. All of the G7 countries have ex-
hibited substantial decreases in TFR and increases in life expectancy. These
developments have provided the main forces that have driven the aging of
the populations of these nations. While increasing life expectancies have
allowed individuals to gain additional years of life, declining fertility rates
have slowed population growth rates. For example, in Japan, the TFR has
declined from 2.05 in 1960-65 to 1.34 in 2005-10, whereas life expectancy at
birth has increased from 67.7 years in 1960 to 81.9 years in 2005. Conse-
quently, in Japan, the population growth rate has declined from 1.26 % in
1960-65 to -0.04 % in 2005-10, and the old age dependency ratio has increased
from 9.0% in 1960 to 29.9% in 2005; in fact, Japan is now experiencing rapid
population decline and population aging.1 In addition to these changes in
demographics, investments in education, particularly higher education, have
greatly increased in industrialized countries over the past several decades.
Table 2 indicates the changes in educational levels that have occurred in ad-
vanced countries during this time period. In these countries, the share of
workers who have obtained a higher education has increased from 8.0 % in
1975 to 16.6 % in 2010.
In this paper, we address how these demographic changes and increases in
education have aected the growth of per capita output over a long time hori-
zon. Because technological progress has been identied as the main driving
force for modern economic growth (e.g., Romer, 1990), we are particularly in-
terested in the eects of demographic changes on research and development
(R&D) investment. Therefore, this paper constructs a simple overlapping
generations version of an R&D-based growth model a la Diamond (1965)
and Jones (1995). This model is then used to examine how an increase in old
age survival probability impacts purposeful R&D investment and long-run
growth by aecting fertility and education decisions.
Many existing studies (e.g., Boucekkine et al. 2002, 2003, de la Croix and
Licandro 1999, 2012, Kalemli-Ozcan 2002, 2003, Zhang and Zhang 2005) ex-
amine the eect of rising longevity on long-run growth by assessing the inu-
1According to the UN (2011), the TFR is now below replacement level in more than
80 countries around the world; moreover, in Europe, Asia and Latin America, the TFR
is predicted to remain far lower than replacement level over the course of the entire 21st
century.
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ence of this longevity on fertility, education and saving decisions.2 However,
most of these studies are based on a model with the following fundamental
engines of growth: the accumulation of human capital; the accumulation of
physical capital; technological progress via learning by doing; or knowledge
spillovers that occur during production. Therefore, these studies cannot an-
alyze the eects of rising longevity and the resulting demographic changes
on purposeful R&D investments, which play a crucial role in modern tech-
nological development.
Conventional semi-endogenous growth models involving purposeful R&D
investment (e.g., Jones 1995, Kortrum 1997, Segerstrom 1998) state that
long-run per capita output growth rate is linearly related to the population
growth rate. A fundamental feature of semi-endogenous growth models is the
idea of decreasing returns from existing scientic knowledge with respect to
the production of new knowledge. This notion of decreasing returns implies
that an increasing supply of researchers is required to maintain a particular
pace of technological progress because the creation of novel scientic knowl-
edge becomes increasingly complex with as technological frontiers expand. If
a constant fraction of population is engaged in the research sector (a condi-
tion that must be fullled in a long-run equilibrium), this increasing supply
of researchers can only be achieved through positive population growth. A
declining population would lead to the stagnation of both productivity and
income per capita.3
However, the empirical evidence during the 20th century does not sup-
port the predictions of semi-endogenous growth models. In particular, many
empirical studies have not identied a simple positive association between
population growth and per capita income growth but have instead demon-
strated the existence of a negative association between these two types of
growth (e.g., Brander and Dowrik 1994, Kelley and Schmidt 1995, Ahituv
2001, and Herzer et al. 2012).4 To reconcile these discrepancies between
2Higher life expectancy increases the return on education and saving, which accelerates
human and physical capital accumulation. The resultant increase in wage and technology
raises the opportunity cost of child bearing, which decreases fertility.
3Early endogenous growth models (e.g., Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpmen 1991,
Aghion and Howitt 1992) imply that long-run per capita output growth rate is linearly
related to population size. Thus a declining population will imply vanishing growth of per
capita income. Peretto (1998), Young (1998) and others integrate features of quality- and
variety-based R&D. Assuming that no knowledge spillovers exist between these two types
of R&D, they predict that only variety-based R&D will be associated with population
growth rate. However, as discussed in Li (2000), if knowledge spillovers between the
quality- and variety-based types of R&D are permitted, the positive association between
population growth and per capita income growth is re-established.
4Furthermore, using data for 67 countries between 1940 and 2000, Struilik et al. (2012)
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theoretical predictions and empirical ndings, Dalgard and Kreiner (2001),
Struilik (2005) and others incorporate human capital accumulation into con-
ventional semi-endogenous growth models and argue that the creation of new
scientic knowledge is dependent on an economy's aggregate human capital
rather than simply the number of workers. These authors demonstrate that
the rapid accumulation of per capita human capital can sustain positive
per capita output growth even under conditions in which overall population
growth stagnates or declines.
Although these studies elucidate the role of aggregate human capital
in economic development by endogenizing individuals' education decisions,
these investigations assume that the population growth rate is exogenously
determined and ignore the micro-level trade-os that individuals face with
respect to fertility and education decisions. In particular, the following two
trade-os exist: (1) the trade-o between the number of children that indi-
viduals have and the amount of education that they can aord for each child
(i.e., a Beckerian quality-quantity trade-o), and (2) the trade-o between
the number of children that individuals have and the amount of time that
they can allocate for their own education. However, in the literature that ad-
dresses demographic transitions, these two types of trade-os are considered
to be relevant for explaining observed demographic changes and shifts in ed-
ucational levels. Therefore, this paper constructs a model in which these two
types of trade-os are explicitly considered and examines how a rise in old
age survival probability impacts purposeful R&D investment and long-run
growth by aecting fertility and education decisions.5
In the model presented here, we show that under certain parameter con-
ditions, the eect of old-age survival probability on growth is positive in
economies in which this probability is relatively low but it could be nega-
tive in economies in which this probability is relatively high. This result is
explained as follows. In economies in which old-age survival probability is
suciently low, an increase in old-age survival probability motivates individ-
uals to invest more in their own education, accelerating the accumulation of
nd a negative correlation between TFP growth rate and population growth rate. They
conrm that this negative correlation holds even after controlling for country- and time-
specic xed eects and/or conning their samples to OECD countries (i.e., countries that
push the world technology frontier).
5Jones (2003), Connolly and Peretto (2003) and others account for endogenous fertility
in the conventional R&D growth model. However, these researchers do not simultane-
ously consider endogenous human capital accumulation. To the best of our knowledge,
only Tournemaine and Luangaram (2012) and Chu et al. (2013) provide exceptional R&D
growth models that incorporate both endogenous fertility and endogenous human capital
accumulation simultaneously. However, these models do not consider the growth implica-
tions of increases in longevity and the resulting demographic changes.
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per capita human capital and thereby enhancing the long-run growth rate of
the economy (i.e., a growth-enhancing quality eect). However, in economies
in which old-age survival probability is suciently high, an increase in old-
age survival probability will lead to greater declines in population growth
rates, retard the rising supply of researchers and thereby lower the long-run
growth rate of the economy (i.e., a growth-impeding quantity eect). These
theoretical results produce somewhat pessimistic predictions regarding fu-
ture economic growth. If an economy reaches the stage of an aging society in
which the old-age survival probability is relatively high and the fertility rate
is relatively low, then the aforementioned growth-impeding quantity eect is
likely to dominate the growth-enhancing quality eect. Therefore, increases
in old-age survival probability and their accompanying declines in fertility
(i.e., population aging) may cause the long-run growth rate of the economy
to deteriorate.
Furthermore, we examine the growth implications of child education sub-
sidy policies and child rearing subsidy policies. A child education subsidy
policy is designed to enhance the accumulation of human capital among chil-
dren by reducing the opportunity costs that parents must pay to educate
their children, whereas a child rearing subsidy policy is designed to promote
fertility increases by reducing the opportunity cost that parents incur from
child rearing and bearing (i.e., child rearing subsidy policies are pro-natal
policies). This study demonstrates that a child education subsidy always
fosters long-run growth, whereas a child rearing subsidy may oppose long-
run growth under certain conditions. These results indicate that even under
the framework of an R&D-based growth model, a child rearing subsidy (i.e., a
pro-natal policy) may not be justied as a growth-enhancing policy. A child
rearing subsidy promotes fertility increases by reducing parents' opportunity
costs for child bearing; however, these increases in fertility rates increase
parents' opportunity costs for child education and thereby lower parental
investments in educating their children. Therefore, the net eect of a child
rearing subsidy on an economy's aggregate human capital is ambiguous. By
contrast, a child education subsidy lowers the parents' opportunity costs for
both child education and child bearing and thereby positively aects the
aggregate human capital of an economy.
During the course of writing this manuscript, we found two recent inter-
esting studies that are closely related to our paper: Prettner (2011) and Stru-
lik et al. (2012). Prettner (2011) introduces Blanchard (1985)-type realistic
demographic structures into conventional endogenous and semi-endogenous
growth models and examines how a rise in longevity and a decline in fertil-
ity aect the long-run growth rate of an economy. Prettner (2011) demon-
strates that a rise in longevity positively aects per capita output growth,
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whereas a decline in fertility negatively aects it. This work is quite interest-
ing because it succeeds in introducing realistic demographic structures into
an R&D-based growth model. However, Prettner (2011) does not explicitly
consider micro-level interactions between fertility and the accumulation of
human capital.
Strulik et al. (2012) introduce R&D-based innovation into a unied
growth framework that includes micro-level fertility and schooling behav-
iors and attempt to explain the historical emergence of R&D-based growth
and the subsequent emergence of mass education and accompanying demo-
graphic transitions. Because they employ an overlapping generations version
of the R&D-based growth model a la Diamond (1965) and Jones (1995), their
work is closely related to our research. However, Strulik et al. (2012) do not
consider the eects of rising longevity and its accompanying demographic
changes but instead focus on the eects of demographic changes that have
been induced by technological progress. Furthermore, to simultaneously ex-
plain several historical observed facts, they incorporate various factors (e.g.,
capital accumulation, technological progress through learning by doing) into
their model and primarily argue their numerical simulation results in the
transition process. They also employ a simplied one-period patent model
to avoid mathematical complications.6 By contrast, this paper constructs
an analytically solvable overlapping generations model with innite patent
protection assumptions and focuses on the long-run growth implications of
rising longevity and its accompanying demographic changes. Although we
share many research interests with Strulik et al. (2012), our research provides
several original contributions that complement their analyses.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
In Section 3, we demonstrate how an increase in old-age survival probability
impacts long-run growth by aecting fertility and education decisions. Sec-
tion 4 considers child education and child rearing subsidy policies and the
inuences of these policies on long-run growth rates and welfare. Section 5
provides several concluding remarks.
6Strulik et al. (2012) include two restrictive assumptions within their conventional one-
period patent model. First, they assume that even after a patent has expired, intermediate
good rms can continue to maintain their monopoly prices. Second, they assume that an
R&D producer in period t that invents a blueprint for a new variety of intermediate goods
that become available from period t + 1 and onwards obtains the monopoly prots of an
intermediate good rm in period t. Thus, the reward that this R&D producer in period t
will receive will not relate to the prots that the producer's invented goods will generate
from period t+ 1 and onwards.
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2 The model
2.1 Environments
Consider a three-period overlapping generations economy in which economic
activity extends over innite discrete time denoted by t = 0; 1;    . Indi-
viduals live for a maximum of three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old
age. During childhood, individuals do not make any decisions and are reared
and educated by their parents. During adulthood, individuals invest in their
own education, raise and educate their children, supply labor to the market,
and consume goods. During old age, individuals retire and only consume
goods. An individual dies at the beginning of old age with a probability of
1    2 [0; 1), and lives through old age with a probability of  2 (0; 1].
The cohort born in period t   1 becomes active workers in period t. Thus,
we call this cohort as generation t, and use Nt to represent the number of
young adults who exist in period t. Let nt denote the number of births for
each young adult. The relationship between the sizes of the young adult
population during any two consecutive periods can therefore be expressed as
Nt+1 = ntNt.
On the production side of the economy, we essentially follow the approach
of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). In this approach, the economy consists
of three sectors: a nal goods sector, an intermediate goods sector, and an
R&D sector. In accordance with Grossman and Helpman (1991), to simplify
the model, we regard labor as the primary production factor in all three of
these sectors and do not consider the role of raw capital. R&D rms invent
blueprints of intermediate goods and conduct the market launches of these
goods. Each intermediate good is produced by a single monopoly rm, using
labor as an input; by contrast, each nal good is produced by competitive
rms, using labor and a variety of imperfectly substitutable intermediate
goods as inputs.
2.2 Preferences and optimization
Individuals derive utility from c1;t, their own consumption during their youth;
c2;t+1, their own consumption during old age; nt, the number of children that
they have; and et, their investment in education for each child. The lifetime
expected utility of individuals in generation t is expressed as
ut =  [lnnt +  ln et] + (1  ) [ln c1;t +  ln c2;t+1] ; ;  2 [0; 1); (1)
where  measures the extent to which parents care about their children rel-
ative to their own lifetime consumption and  expresses the old-age survival
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probability. Parents derive utility from et, their investments in education
for each of their children. This utility, captured by the  ln et component,
could originate from either the warm glow of giving (Andreoni, 1989) or a
preference for having higher-quality children (Becker, 1960). Here,  mea-
sures the strength of this utility factor relative to an individual's number of
children. Our condition that  2 [0; 1) implies that having a family must be
more important than investments in the education of one's children.7
After being raised and educated by their parents, during their second pe-
riod of life, individuals are endowed with one unit of time, which is devoted
to working in the labor market (`t), rearing nt identical children, educating
each child (et) and investing in the individual's own education (mt). Individ-
uals also divide their income wtht`t between consumption c1;t and saving st
for their old age. Here, ht represents the consequent level of human capital
as a result of own education mt. We discuss this point rigorously later. For
simplicity, we assume that insurance companies are risk-neutral and that the
private annuities market is competitive. Insurance companies promise indi-
viduals a payment (Rt+1=)st, in exchange for which the estate st accrues
to the companies, where  is the average probability of surviving and Rt+1
represents the gross rate of interest. In the absence of a bequest motive,
individuals are willing to invest their assets in such insurance. Finally, dur-
ing the third period of life, survivors are retired and spend their savings on
their old age consumption c2;t+1. Thus, the budget and time constraints for
individuals in generation t are expressed as follows:
c1;t + st = wtht`t; (2)
c2;t+1 =
Rt+1

st; (3)
`t + (z + et)nt +mt = 1: (4)
Following Becker (1965) and others, we assume that a xed amount of time z
is required to bear and raise a child. The time constraint dened in (4) iden-
ties two crucial trade-os that parents face. First, parents face a trade-o
between the number of children they have and the amount of education that
they can aord for each child (i.e., a Beckerian quality-quantity trade-o). If
other variables are held constant, we note from (4) that a larger investment
in education for each child et is associated with a smaller number of children
nt. Second, parents face a trade-o in allocating their time between rearing
and educating their children and investing in their own education. If other
7This assumption ensures the existence of a consistent solution and is common in the
unied growth literature. For instance, see Strulik (2004, 2008).
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variables are held constant, we observe from (4) that a larger investment
in one's own education mt is accompanied by either a smaller number of
children nt or a smaller investment in education for each child et.
8
In accordance with the specications that have been provided by Kalemli-
Ozcan (2002, 2003), the production function of human capital ht is given by
the following expression:
ht = Eht 1eet 1m
m
t ; E > 0; e  0; m  0; e + m  1 (5)
where E, e and m are parameters; ht 1 indicates the human capital stock
of parents; et 1 denotes the parental investment in education for each child
during period t   1; and mt represents investments in one's own education
during period t.9 As in de la Croix and Licandro (2012), parental investment
in education for each child et 1 can be interpreted as investment in basic
education (i.e., early childhood education, primary education and early sec-
ondary education) because parents must devote a great deal of time and
money to their children's basic education. By contrast, investment in one's
own education mt can be interpreted as investment in higher education (i.e.,
upper secondary education and tertiary education) because children face high
opportunity costs for obtaining a higher education and typically are respon-
sible for paying for a substantial proportion of these costs.
By maximizing (1), subject to (2)-(5), we obtain the following solution:
st =
(1  )
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) + wtht; (6)
8The rst trade-o is stressed by Becker et al. (1990), Galor and Weil (2000) and
other studies in the unied growth literature. The second trade-o is stressed by Kimura
and Yasui (2007), Soares and Falc~ao (2008) and de la Croix and Licandro (2012), among
others.
9In accordance with the approaches of Lucus (1988), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2003), Stru-
lik (2005) and others, we assume that the human capital production function is linear with
respect to human capital level in the previous period ht 1 so as to be compatible with
endogenous growth. This linearity assumption may be somewhat relaxed by explicitly con-
sidering externality eects generated by economy-wide human capital stocks. For example,
as discussed by Yakita (2010), the production function of human capital ht in (5) may be
written as follows: ht = Eh
1 e m
t 1 (ht 1et 1)
e(ht 1mt)m where ht 1 is human capital
stock of their parents, and ht 1 represents the average human capital stock of generation
t   1. The term h1 e mt 1 represents the spillovers from society, reecting the fact that
learning is more productive if an individual interacts with more knowledgeable people. By
contrast, the terms (ht 1et 1)e and (ht 1mt)m represent peer eects within a family,
reecting the fact that learning is more productive if one's parents are well educated.
Because no individual heterogeneities exist within a generation, the relation ht 1 = ht 1
holds at equilibrium. Thus, this human capital production function that is homogeneous
of degree one is compatible with endogenous growth.
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nt =
1
z
(1  )
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +   n; (7)
et =
z
1    e; (8)
mt =
m(1  )(1 + )
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +   m; (9)
ht = Ee
emmht 1: (10)
From (6)-(10), saving (st) increases with wages (wt); by contrast, fertility
(nt), investments in education for each child (et), and investments in one's
own education (mt) are constant with respect to wt because positive income
and negative substitution eects cancel each other.
According to (7) and (9), fertility nt decreases with , the old-age sur-
vival probability (i.e., @nt
@
< 0), whereas investment in one's own education
mt increases with  (i.e.,
@mt
@
> 0). An increase in , the old-age survival
probability, stimulates a demand for consumption relative to the demand
for children because this increase causes individuals to anticipate a need for
consuming goods over a longer period of time. In response to this change, in-
dividuals shift their time from child rearing to work but maintain a constant
level of education for each child (et). The resulting increases in working time
raise the returns from an individual's own education, which increases the
individual's investment in this education. This positive relationship between
life expectancy and investment in one's own education is the well-known
Ben-Porath mechanism; higher life expectancy aects education because in-
dividuals anticipate having longer active lives.10
10Boucekkine et al. (2002, 2003), Soares and Falc~ao (2008), de la Croix and Licandro
(2012) and others convincingly argue that the Ben-Porath mechanism plays an active
role in explaining the increases in secondary educational attainments and demographic
transitions that have been observed over time. However, the Ben-Porath mechanism has
recently been subject to criticism from Hazan (2009). Hazan (2009) reveals that the
lifetime labor input of American men who were born from 1840-1970 declined despite
dramatic gains in life expectancy. Hazan further argues that a rise in the lifetime labor
supply is a necessary implication of the Ben-Porath model; this implication would create
concerns regarding the ability of this type of model to explain increases in education that
have occurred in various nations. Cervellati and Sunde (2009) demonstrate that Hazan's
critique is only valid under specic assumptions and is much less general than Hazan
claims. Hazan (2009) himself also notes that if the labor supply of women is explicitly
considered, estimates of the decline in lifetime labor supply across cohorts are much smaller
in magnitude compared with the corresponding labor supply estimates for men. In our
paper, due to the explicit consideration of fertility choices, the labor supply of woman is
a relevant issue. Taking into accounts of limitations of the labor supply data for women,
Hazan's results should be interpreted with caution. In fact, Soares and Falc~ao (2008)
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These theoretical results are partially consistent with recent empirical
ndings. For example, Soares and Falc~ao (2008) nd that the female labor
supply is positively associated with adult survival probability through time
both across and within countries. Furthermore, Lehr (2009) and Becker et
al. (2011) reveal that higher levels of parental education are causally related
to negative eects on fertility. A cross-country analysis by Zhang and Zhang
(2005) reveals that life expectancy is positively correlated with saving rate
and secondary school enrollment ratio but negatively related to fertility rate.
2.3 Final goods sector
A nal good Yt is produced by competitive rms. This production uses a
composite of intermediate goods, Xt, and labor, which may be expressed in
terms of eciency units, HY;t:
Yt = H
1 
Y;t X

t ; 0 <  < 1: (11)
The composite factor Xt is a CES aggregate of quantities xi;t of intermediate
goods:
Xt =
Z At
0
x"i;tdi
1="
; 0 < " < 1: (12)
At denotes the variety of intermediate goods or the level of technological
knowledge in an economy, which grows through R&D. The existing interme-
diate goods exhibit a constant elasticity of substitution that is expressed as
follows: 1
1 " . In this expression, a higher " indicates the existence of greater
substitutability between the intermediate inputs.
Let wt and pi;t represent the wage of workers and the price of intermediate
good i, respectively. Using nal goods as our numeraire, the conditions
for prot maximization in the competitive nal goods sector produce the
following equations:
wt = (1  )H Y;tXt = (1  )
Yt
HY;t
; (13)
pi;t = H
1 
Y;t X
 "
t x
" 1
i;t : (14)
From (11) and (14), given Yt, we can express the demand for the intermediate
good i as follows:
xi;t =
p
 1=(1 ")
i;tR At
0
p
 "=(1 ")
i;t di
Yt: (15)
nd that the female labor supply tends to be positively associated with adult survival
probability through time both across and within countries.
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2.4 Intermediate goods sector
Each intermediate good i is produced by monopolistically competitive rms
that hold a blueprint of the intermediate good i. One eciency unit of labor
is required to produce one unit of an intermediate good, and the operating
prot of each intermediate good producer di;t is expressed as follows: di;t =
(pi;t wt)xi;t. Under monopolistic competition, each rm maximizes its prot
given a demand of (15) by establishing a price that is equal to a constant
markup over unit cost:
pi;t = pt =
1
"
wt; (16)
Thus, the rm-specic index in the intermediate goods sector can be dropped,
and prots may therefore be expressed as follows:
dt = (1  ")ptxt: (17)
2.5 R&D sector
The development of R&D technology requires labor as its only private input,
and the existing stock of knowledge can have an external eect on the pro-
ductivity of the R&D sector. Between periods t and t+1, competitive R&D
rms employ HA;t eciency units of labor as researchers, develop At+1   At
new blueprints, and sell these blueprints to intermediate good rms at their
market values of Vt. Thus, given a research productivity of t, output is
expressed as follows:
At+1   At = tHA;t: (18)
In accordance with Jones (1995), research productivity is given to each single
rm but depends on the aggregate level, positively on the number of already
existing ideas (0 <  < 1 the standing-on-shoulders eect) and possibly
negatively on the size of the researchers (0   < 1, the stepping-on-toes
eect);
t = A
 
t (HA;t)
  ;  > 0: (19)
The standing-on-shoulders eect may arise because part of the output of
R&D is knowledge that contributes to the capacity to innovate. The stepping-
on-toes eect may arise out of patent races in which multiple rms run paral-
lel research programs in the hope of being the rst to succeed at creating and
patenting a new good or process. If all other factors are held constant, an
increase in R&D eorts will induce increased duplication of research eorts
that reduces the average productivity of R&D in the economy.
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Assuming free entry in R&D sector, the expected gain of VttHA;t from
R&D must not exceed the cost of wtHA;t for a nite size of R&D activities
at equilibrium. Thus we have the following conditions:
Vtt
(
= wt, then HA;t > 0; At+1 > At;
< wt, then HA;t = 0; At+1 = At:
(20)
We next consider non-arbitrage conditions. The market value of inter-
mediate good rms Vt (i.e., the market value of blueprints) is related to
the risk-free interest rate Rt. Shareholders of intermediate good rms that
bought these shares during period t obtain dividends of dt+1 during period
t + 1 and can sell these shares to the subsequent generation at the value of
Vt+1. In the nancial market, the total returns from holding the stock of
a particular intermediate rm must be equal to the returns on the risk-free
asset Rt+1Vt, which implies the following no-arbitrage condition:
Rt+1 =
dt+1 + Vt+1
Vt
: (21)
2.6 Market-clearing conditions
The market clearing condition for labor is expressed as follows:
HY;t + Atxt +HA;t = Ht; (22)
where Ht  ht`tNt. The sum of HY;t, the labor demands for the nal goods
sector; Atxt, the labor demands for the intermediate goods sector; and HA;t,
the labor demands for the R&D sector must be equal to the total supply of
eciency units of labor by young adults Ht.
Furthermore, using the nal goods market equilibrium condition of Yt =
c1;tNt+ c2;tNt 1, we can obtain the following asset market equilibrium con-
dition:11
VtAt+1 = stNt; for Vtt = wt: (23)
The derivation of (23) is provided in Appendix A. This condition states that
the savings of young adults in period t must be used for investments in new
inventions (Vt(At+1   At)) or for the purchase of existing stocks that were
owned by the preceding generations (VtAt). Given the externality eects in
the R&D sector specied in (19), as demonstrated in Appendix B, the case
in which the R&D sector does not operate (i.e., HA;t = 0) never occurs at
equilibrium.
11An analogous asset market equilibrium condition is also presented by Tanaka and
Iwaisako (2011).
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 Dynamics
This subsection examines the dynamic properties of the economy. First, we
consider the dynamics of the aggregate eective labor supplies (Ht  ht`tNt),
which are determined by the per capita human capital (ht), labor supply (`t)
and population size (Nt) for young adults.
From (10), the dynamics of the per capita human capital are determined
by the following equation: ht = Ee
emmht 1. In addition, from (4), (7),
(8) and (9), the labor supply of each young adult is constant (i.e., `t =
(1 )(1+)
(1 )(1+m)(1+)+  `). Thus, using Nt+1 = ntNt and (7), the dynamics
of the aggregate eective labor supply (Ht  ht`tNt) are described by the
following expression:
Ht+1
Ht
= Eeemmn: (24)
We then consider the dynamics of product variety At. Because the re-
lationship Vtt = wt holds at equilibrium, from (23) with (6), (19) and
Ht  ht`tNt, we can obtain the following equation:
At+1 =

1 + 
A t H
 
A;tHt: (25)
In addition, using (18) and (19), the labor engaged in R&D sector HA;t is
represented as follows:
HA;t =

1

 1
1 
A
1  
1 
t

At+1
At
  1
 1
1 
: (26)
Hence, by substituting (26) into (25), the dynamics of At is expressed in the
following manner:
At+2
At+1
=

At+1
At
  
1 

At+2=At+1   1
At+1=At   1
  
1  Ht+1
Ht
: (27)
Now, let us dene the growth rate of product variety as gA;t  (At+1   At) =At.
By substituting (24) into (27) and rearranging them, we obtain the following
autonomous dynamic system of gA;t:
L(gA;t+1) = R(gA;t); (28)
where
L(gA;t+1)  (1 + gA;t+1) (gA;t+1)

1  ;
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R(gA;t)  Eeemmn (1 + gA;t)
  
1  (gA;t)

1  :
We dene the state of the economy at which the growth rate of product
variety At does not change (i.e., gA;t+1 = gA;t = gA) as the balanced growth
path (BGP). From (28), the growth rate of product variety gA in the balanced
growth path (BGP) satises the following condition:
1 + gA = (Ee
emmn)
1 
1  : (29)
From (24) and (29), similarly to conventional R&D-based growth models
with human capital accumulation, the growth rate of product variety gA in
the balanced growth path is linearly related to the growth rate of aggregate
eective labor supplies (Ht). Furthermore, given that  < 1, the following
relationship holds around the steady-state equilibrium:
dgA;t+1
dgA;t gA;t+1=gA;t=gA
=
0R(gA)
0L(gA)
=
(   ) + (1 + gA)g 1A
(1  ) + (1 + gA)g 1A
2 (0; 1): (30)
Given initial values of A0, N0, h 1 and e 1, the value of gA;0 is derived
automatically from (24) and (27).12 Thus, Equation (30) indicates that the
steady-state equilibrium that is characterized by the balanced growth path
(i.e., gA;t+1 = gA;t = gA) is locally stable.
Finally, we consider the growth rate of per capita GDP yt, which is dened
by yt  YtNt . According to (11), the GDP in this economy is given by the
following expression:13
Yt = H
1 
Y;t

A
1
"
t xt

= A
1 "
"

t H
1 
Y;t (Atxt)
 : (31)
Based on this equation, as shown in Appendix C, we can derive per capita
GDP yt as follows:
yt  Yt
Nt
= A
1 "
"

t

1  
1 + 
gA;t
1 + gA;t

Ht
Nt
; (32)
12Note that h 1 and e 1 are per capita human capital and parental investment in edu-
cation for each child of generation  1. Given A0, N0, h 1 and e 1, `0 and m0 are dened
to be the optimal choices of generation 0. Thus H0  N0h0`0 is uniquely determined. By
substituting A0 and H0 into equations (24) and (27), the values of A1 and H1 are explicitly
calculated. Therefore, the value of gA;0  (A1  A0) =A0 is automatically derived.
13As specied by (16), all intermediate goods hold the same price; therefore, nal good
producers utilize the same quantity of each intermediate good (i.e., xi;t = xt). As a result,
(12) can be rewritten as follows: Xt = A
1="
t xt.
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where   "(1  )1 =(1  + "). Thus, in the balanced growth path
(BGP) in which gA;t becomes constant, the per capita GDP growth rate gy;t
must satisfy the following condition:
1 + gy;t  yt+1
yt
=

At+1
At
 1 "
"

Ht+1
Ht

Nt+1
Nt
 1
: (33)
Substituting (24), (29) and Nt+1 = nNt into (33), the per capita GDP growth
rate gy in the balanced growth path (BGP) is expressed as follows:
1 + gy = (Ee
emm)1+
1 
1  
1 "
"
 (n)
1 
1  
1 "
"
 : (34)
This equation (i.e., (34)) appears to suggest that per capita GDP growth
gy and population growth n are positively correlated; this positive correla-
tion would be consistent with the results of conventional R&D-based growth
models. Furthermore, in accordance with the ndings from conventional
R&D-based growth models that consider human capital accumulation, su-
ciently high levels of investment in education (i.e., e;m > 0) appear to ensure
sustainable growth even for situations in which population size is constant
(i.e., Nt+1
Nt
= n = 1) or decreasing (i.e., Nt+1
Nt
= n < 1). However, these macro-
level supercial examinations disregard the micro-level interactions between
human capital accumulation and fertility rate. Based on these micro-level
interactions, we have derived that investment in education and fertility are
endogenous and inversely correlated via quantity-quality trade-o. In partic-
ular, in an environment in which adult longevity increases (e.g., as a result
of improvements in medical knowledge and health-related infrastructure),
increases in individuals' investments in their own education and declines in
fertility will simultaneously occur, as shown in Section 2-2. To rigorously in-
vestigate this issue, in the following subsection, we examine how an increase
in old-age survival probability impacts per capita GDP growth rate gy by
aecting fertility and education decisions.
3.2 Old-age survival probability and per capita GDP
growth
In this subsection, we examine how , the old-age survival probability, im-
pacts long-run per capita GDP growth rate by aecting fertility and educa-
tion decisions. As discussed in section 2-2, the old-age survival probability
() positively aects individuals' investments in their own education (i.e.,
@m
@
> 0), whereas it negatively aects fertility (i.e., @n
@
< 0). Thus, from (34),
, the old-age survival probability, has two competing eects on gy, the long-
run per capita GDP growth rate. These eects include a growth-enhancing
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quality eect caused by increases in individuals' investments in their own
education (m) and a growth-impeding quantity eect that is caused by de-
clines in fertility (n). On the one hand, an increase in the old-age survival
probability () enhances individuals' investments in their own educations
(mt), accelerates the accumulation of human capital by each researcher in an
economy (ht) and thereby increases the per capita GDP growth rate (i.e., a
growth-enhancing quality eect). On the other hand, an increase in the old-
age survival probability () lowers the population growth rate (nt), retards
the growth in the supply of available researchers, and thereby reduces the
per capita GDP growth rate (i.e., a growth-impeding quantity eect).
By dierentiating (34) with respect to , given (7) and (9), we obtain the
following expression:
@gy
@
= B [    (; )] ; (35)
where
B 
(1 + gy)m
h
1 + 1 
1  
1 "
"


1 + (1+m)(1+)
m
i
(1 + ) [(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) + ] > 0;
 (; )  1
1
1+
m
1+m
 
1 + 1  
1 
"
1 "
1


+ 1
2 [0; 1];
@ (;)
@
> 0,  (;)
@
< 0, @
@
[@ (;)
@
] < 0, lim!0  (; ) < 1 and lim!1  (; ) =
0. See Appendix D for the derivation of (35). Given that B > 0, the sign
of @gy
@
depends on the sign of [    (; )]. To understand the properties of
[    (; )], we consider the following two parameters: , the relative utility
weight that is allocated to children, and , the strength of the stepping-on-
toes eect. We rigorously examine how these two parameters aect the sign
of @gy
@
. To emphasize our concern, the two parameters of  and  are high-
lighted in the above equations.
From (35) and the fact that  (0; ) <  (1; ), we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 In the balanced growth path (BGP), suppose we dene ^ as
 =  (^; ), then following statements hold.
(1) If  <  (0; ),
@gy
@
< 0 for  2 (0; 1];
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(2) If  >  (1; ),
@gy
@
> 0 for  2 (0; 1];
(3) If  (0; )     (1; ),
@gy
@
(
 0, for  2 (0; ^];
< 0, for  2 (^; 1]:
Figure 1 represents the parameter regions in which proposition 1-(1), 1-(2)
and 1-(3) hold. Proposition 1-(1) and 1-(2) indicate that in an economy in
which the relative utility weight given to children  is suciently small (resp.
large) to satisfy  <  (0; ) (resp.  >  (1; )), the growth-impeding quan-
tity eect dominates (resp. is dominated by) the growth-enhancing quality
eect, and an increase in , the old-age survival probability, negatively (resp.
positively) aects gy, the per capita GDP growth rate.
Intuitively, the relative strengths of the growth-impeding quantity ef-
fect and the growth-enhancing quality eect depend on the elasticity of fer-
tility (nt) with respect to  (i.e.,

nt
@nt
@
=   (1 )(1+m)
(1 )(1+m)(1+)+ < 0) and
the elasticity of one's own education (mt) with respect to  (i.e.,

mt
@mt
@
=

[(1 )(1+m)(1+)+]

1+
> 0). From these two elasticities, a small (resp. large)
value of , the relative utility weight that is allocated to children, produces
the following inequality: j 
nt
@nt
@
j > j 
mt
@mt
@
j (resp. j 
nt
@nt
@
j < j 
mt
@mt
@
j). Since
parents evaluate less (resp. more) about their children, a small (resp. large)
value of  leads to low (resp. high) fertility (nt), and high (resp. low) one's
own education (mt). Thus, given a suciently small (resp. large) value of 
and correspondingly low (resp. high) values for fertility (nt) and high (resp.
low) values for a one's own education (mt), a one-unit increase in old-age sur-
vival probability () will produce a relatively small (resp. large) increase in
individuals' own educationmt and large (resp. small) decreases in fertility nt.
Consequently, if the relative utility weight that is allocated to children () is
suciently small (resp. large) to satisfy  <  (0; ) (resp.  >  (1; )), then
j 
nt
@nt
@
j > j 
mt
@mt
@
j (resp. j 
nt
@nt
@
j < j 
mt
@mt
@
j), and the growth-impeding quan-
tity eect dominates (resp. is dominated by) the growth-enhancing quality
eect, and the old-age survival probability therefore has a negative (resp.
positive) overall eect on the per capita GDP growth rate.
Furthermore, Proposition 1-(3) indicates that as shown in Figure 2-1, if
the relative utility weight given to children () is at intermediate values that
satisfy  (0; )     (1; ), there is a hump-shaped relationship between
old-age survival probability () and the per capita GDP growth rate (gy).
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Figure 2-1 presents a numerical example of the relationship between old-age
survival probability () and per capita GDP growth rate (gy), if the value of 
satises  (0; )     (1; ). Figure 2-2 and 2-3 illustrate the corresponding
relationships between old-age survival probability () and population growth
rate (n), and between old-age survival probability () and an individuals'
investments in their own education (m), respectively. Moreover, Figure 2-4
depicts the relationship between the per capita GDP growth rate and the
population growth rate (n) as the value of the old-age survival probability
 is increased from 0 to 1. We discuss Figure 2-4 rigorously in the next
subsection. The parameters used in the base-case simulation are described in
footnote 14, and explanations of these parameters are provided in Appendix
E.14 15
In economies in which the old-age survival probability is suciently low,
the growth-enhancing quality eect dominate the growth-impeding quantity
eect. Therefore, increases in old-age survival probability () will enhance
individuals' investments in their own education (mt), accelerate researchers'
accumulation of human capital (ht), and thereby raise the per capita GDP
growth rate. However, in economies in which old-age survival probability is
suciently high, the growth-impeding quantity eect dominates the growth-
enhancing quality eect. Therefore, increases in old-age survival probability
() will lower population growth rates (nt), retard the expansion of the supply
of researchers and thereby decrease rates of per capita GDP growth.
The results of proposition 2-(3) are intuitively explained as follows. Anal-
ogously to the case of , a small value of , the old-age survival probabil-
ity, produces the following inequality: j 
nt
@nt
@
j < j 
mt
@mt
@
j (resp. j 
nt
@nt
@
j >
j 
mt
@mt
@
j). From (7) and (9), a small (resp. large) value of  results in a high
(resp. low) fertility rate nt and a low (resp. high) level of a one's own edu-
cation mt. Thus, given a suciently small (resp. large) value of  and the
resulting high (resp. low) level of fertility (nt) and low (resp. high) level of
one's own education (mt), a one-unit increase in old-age survival probability
() generates a relatively large (resp. small) increase in one's own educa-
tion (mt) and a small (resp. large) decrease in fertility (nt). Consequently,
if the old-age survival probability () is suciently low (resp. high), then
j 
nt
@nt
@
j < j 
mt
@mt
@
j (resp. j 
nt
@nt
@
j > j 
mt
@mt
@
j); thus, the growth-enhancing qual-
14In the base-case simulation, we set  = 0:3,  = 0:7, E = 6:0675, e = 0:25, m = 0:75,
z = (1 )2(1 )(1+m)+ ,  = 0:5,  = 0:2,
 = 10,  = 0:83,  = 0:4,  = 1, e = 0, n = 0. To
investigate the eect of an increase in old-age survival probability, we increased the value
of  from 0.1 to 1 in increments of 0.1.
15The objective of this numerical analysis is to supplement the qualitative results of
Proposition 1. Although the authors chose the values of the parameters carefully, these
quantitative results should be interpreted with caution.
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ity eect dominates (resp. is dominated by) the growth-impeding quantity
eect, and the old-age survival probability has a positive (resp. negative)
eect on the rate of per capita GDP growth.
Finally, as described in Figure 1, a stronger stepping-on-toes eect (i.e.,
a higher value of ) expands the parameter regions in which the old-age
survival probability positively aects the per capita GDP growth rate (i.e.,
@gy
@
> 0).16 When the stepping-on-toes eect is strong, the size of workers
engaged in the R&D sector has little eect on a the new variety expansions
because the benets from R&D eorts from a large numbers of researchers
are oset by the increased duplication of research eorts. In particular, from
(34), if the stepping-on-toes eect is extremely strong (i.e., if  = 1), the
growth rate of both the overall population and of researchers in particular (n)
has no eect on the per capita GDP growth rate, and the growth-impeding
quantity eect becomes negligible. Therefore, if the stepping-on-toes eect
is strong, then the growth-enhancing quality eect is more likely to dominate
the growth-impeding quantity eect; thus, the old-age survival probability
() is likely to have a positive eect on the per capita GDP growth rate.
3.3 The relationship between per capita GDP growth
and population growth
In this subsection, we examine how changes in per capita GDP growth and
population growth are correlated in a balanced growth path in which the old-
age survival probability is improved by exogenous factors (e.g., improvements
in medical knowledge and in health-related infrastructure). In this study, to
avoid lexicographic explanations, we focus our analyses on the case in which
the condition  (0; )     (1; ) holds. The results for situations in which
 <  (0; ) or  >  (1; ) are easily inferred from the following analyses.17
As shown in Figure 2-1 and 2-2, in the balanced growth path, if the old-age
survival probability () is suciently low, then old-age survival probability
() produce increases in the per capita GDP growth rate (gy) and decreases
in the population growth rate (n). Therefore, in an economy in which the
old-age survival probability () is suciently low and the population growth
16From (35), analogous to the eect of , a higher elasticity of substitution among
intermediate goods (") and a lower intensity of intermediate goods in the nal goods
sector () will enlarge the parameter regions in which the relationship
@gy
@ > 0 holds.
Both a higher " and a lower  induce smaller monopoly prots for intermediate good
rms, reduce the rates of growth in product variety in the R&D sector, and weaken the
growth-impeding quantity eect of increases in the old-age survival probability.
17The issue of which parameter regions are most likely to exist is a purely empirical
concern. However, it is dicult to obtain precise estimates of  and .
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rate is suciently high, changes in the per capita GDP growth rate (gy) and
population growth rate (n) are negatively correlated with increases in the
old-age survival probability.18 However, if the old-age survival probability
() is suciently high, both the per capita GDP growth rate (gy) and the
population growth rate (n) will decrease with increases in the old-age sur-
vival probability (). Thus, in an economy in which the old-age survival
probability () is suciently high and the corresponding population growth
is suciently low, changes in the per capita GDP growth rate (gy) and the
population growth rate (n) will be positively correlated with increases in the
old-age survival probability.19 Consequently, as shown in Figure 2-4, we ob-
serve a negative relationship between the per capita GDP growth rate and
the population growth rate in regions in which the population growth rate
is high but a positive relationship between the per capita GDP growth rate
and the population growth rate in regions in which the population growth
rate is low.
A conventional semi-endogenous growth model predicts that the per capita
GDP growth rate will be positively correlated with the population growth
rate n; however, this correlation is dicult to observe in the extant empir-
ical data. However, if increases in old-age survival probability are regarded
as an exogenous source of demographic transition, then by considering the
micro-level interactions between human capital investment and fertility, we
can conrm that the per capita GDP growth rate is not necessarily positively
correlated with the population growth rate (n).
The predictions of Figures 2-1 to 2-4 produce somewhat gloomy perspec-
tives regarding future economic growth. If the economy reaches the stage of
an aging society in which the old-age survival probability is relatively high
and the fertility rate is relatively low, the growth-impeding quantity eect of
increases in the old-age survival probability is likely to dominate the growth-
enhancing quality eect of these increases. Therefore, further increases in
old-age survival probability and the accompanying declines in fertility (i.e.,
population aging) may deteriorate the long-run growth rate of the economy.
18Analogously, in an economy in which the relative utility weight allocated to children
 is suciently large to satisfy  >  (1; ) (i.e., Proposition 1-(2)), changes in the per
capita GDP growth rate (gy) and population growth rate (n) are negatively correlated
with increases in the old-age survival probability ().
19Analogously, in an economy in which the relative utility weight allocated to children
() is suciently small to satisfy  <  (0; ) (i.e., Proposition 1-(1)), changes in the per
capita GDP growth rate (gy) and population growth rate (n) are positively correlated with
increases in the old-age survival probability ().
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4 Child education and child rearing subsidy
policies
All developed countries provide a set of education policies for enhancing
the accumulation of human capital among children (for instance, industrial-
ized nations typically feature not only the public provision of primary and
secondary education but also subsidies for pre-primary and tertiary educa-
tion). Broadly speaking, these policies can be interpreted as a child education
subsidy policy that encourages parents to increase their investments in the
education of their children. Furthermore, many developed countries that
face extremely low fertility rates and rapid population aging provide a set
of welfare policies for improving the child rearing environment (e.g., mater-
nity/paternity leave, child care facilities, child allowances, and income tax
exemptions). One of the main objectives of these child rearing subsidy poli-
cies is to prevent further declines in the fertility rate by reducing parents'
opportunity costs for child bearing and rearing. For example, in Japan, the
government has been adopting various pro-natal policies since the 1990s (e.g.,
the expansion of the child allowance, the introduction of child care leave, and
improvements in child care services). These policies are intended to avoid de-
mographic changes that could produce a crisis of the public pension system,
labor shortages, economic stagnation, and a loss of societal vitality.20 In this
section, we examine how these two types of subsidy policies (child education
subsidies and child rearing subsidies) aect the per capita GDP growth rate
and the lifetime utility levels of individuals.
4.1 Growth eects
In this subsection, we examine the growth eects of two types of subsidy
policies: child education subsidies and child rearing subsidies. The govern-
ment levies a tax t on the labor income of all young adult individuals and
compensates these individuals for a fraction of their parenting-related op-
portunity costs, which consist of the periods of time that are spent away
from work to raise (znt) and educate their children (etnt). If individuals in
generation t allocated their time to work, they would obtain (1  t)wtht per
unit of time. Thus, this paper assumes that the government subsidizes a
fraction e 2 (0; 1) of (1   t)wtht for each unit of time that parents devote
to educating their children etnt. This subsidy represents the government's
child education subsidy policy. Analogously, the government subsidizes a
fraction n 2 (0; 1) of (1   t)wtht for each unit of time that parents devote
20See, e.g., Atoh and Akachi (2003) and Suzuki (2006).
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to bearing and raising their children znt. This subsidy represents the child
rearing subsidy policy.21
Under these two types of subsidy policies, the government's budget con-
straints at any point of time t is written as follows:
twtht`t = n(1  t)wthtznt + e(1  t)wthtetnt; (36)
where twtht`t expresses the per capita tax revenue, n(1   t)wthtznt ex-
presses the per capita child rearing subsidy payment, and e(1  t)wthtetnt
expresses the per capita child education subsidy payment.
The budget constraint of the individual in generation t is represented,
together with (3) and (4), as follows:
c1;t + st = (1  t)wtht f1  [(1  n)z + (1  e)et]nt  mtg : (37)
Thus, an individual in generation t maximizes (1) subject to (3), (4), (5) and
(37). Consequently, we obtain the following results:
st =
(1  )
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +  (1  t)wtht; (38)
nt =
1
(1  n)z
(1  )
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +   n(n); (39)
et =
1  n
1  e
z
1    e(e; n); (40)
In addition, we obtain (9), ht = Eht 1[e(e; n)]emm . From (39), a higher
child rearing subsidy (n) leads to a higher fertility rate (nt) because this
subsidy decreases parents' opportunity costs of child bearing. However, from
(40), a higher child rearing subsidy (n) produces a lower investment in ed-
ucation for each child (et) because the increase in the fertility rate (nt) that
occurs as a result of n increases the opportunity costs that parents incur
for providing their children with educations. Thus, a child rearing subsidy
n generates a substitutive eect in which quality of children is replaced by
quantity of children.
By contrast, according to (39) and (40), a higher child education subsidy
(e) produces a higher investment in education for each child et but leaves the
fertility rate (nt) unchanged. This result is explained as follows. According
to (36), a child education subsidy e decreases the parental opportunity costs
21These representations of subsidy policies are abstract and may initially appear to be
unrealistic. However, these specications allow us to clearly capture the dierence between
child education subsidies and child rearing subsidies.
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of both child education and child bearing, positively aecting both child ed-
ucation and fertility. However, because the decline in the opportunity cost of
child education is greater than the corresponding decline in the opportunity
cost of child bearing, the investment in education for each child et increases
more elastically. This increase in a parent's investment in education for each
child (et) increases the opportunity costs of child bearing for parents, oset-
ting the direct positive eects of e on the fertility rate (nt). Consequently,
the fertility rate (nt) will remain constant with respect to e. Hence, a child
education subsidy e increases the quality of children without aecting the
quantity of children. To emphasize these relationships, we denote nt by n(n)
and et by e(e; n). Finally, according to (9), an investment in one's own ed-
ucation mt is neutral with respect to these two types of subsidy policies.
Solving the model in an analogous way to previous sections, the per capita
GDP growth rate (gy) in the balanced growth path is again given by (34).
Hence, using (34), nt = n(n) and et = e(e; n), we obtain the following
proposition.22
Proposition 2 Under child education and child rearing subsidy policies, in
the balanced growth path (BGP), the following comparative statics results
hold.
(1) @gy
@e
> 0,
(2) @gy
@n
< ()0; ife > ()
(),
where 
()  (1 )(1 ")
(1 )(1 ")+(1  )" ,
@
()
@
< 0, @
@
[@
()
@
] < 0, lim!0
() < 1
and lim!1
() = 0.
Proposition 2-(1) indicates that a child education subsidy e positively im-
pacts the per capita GDP growth rate by increasing the parental investment
in education for each child (e). Using (34) and the fact that @e
@e
> 0, @n
@e
= 0
and @m
@e
= 0, we can easily conrm that the relationship @gy
@e
> 0 holds.
The results of Proposition 2-(2) are summarized in Figure 3. Proposi-
tion 2-(2) indicates that if the intensity of parental educational investment
in human capital production e is suciently large (resp. small) to satisfy
e > 
() (resp. e  
()), child rearing subsidies n have negative (resp.
non-negative) eects on the per capita GDP growth rate gy. As discussed
above, a child rearing subsidy n positively aects the fertility rate (i.e.,
@n
@n
> 0) but negatively aects the parental investment in education for each
child (i.e., @e
@n
< 0). Thus, based on (34), a child rearing subsidy n has two
22See Appendix D for the derivation of Proposition 2-(2).
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competing eects on the per capita GDP growth rate gy. These eects com-
prise a growth-enhancing quantity eect that reects an increase in fertility
(n) and a growth-impeding quality eect that is mediated by a decline in
parental investments in education for each child (e). Thus, a rise in the child
rearing subsidy (n) increases the population growth rate (n), contributes to
expanding the supply of available researchers, and consequently increases gy,
the per capita GDP growth rate (i.e., a growth-enhancing quantity eect).
However, an increase in the child rearing subsidy (n) lowers the parental in-
vestment in education for each child (e), retards the accumulation of human
capital by researchers, and thereby decreases gy, the per capita GDP growth
rate (i.e., a growth-impeding quality eect).
From (34), the value of e indicates the signicance of parental edu-
cational investment as a determinant of the per capita GDP growth rate.
Therefore, if e, the parental educational investment intensity in the produc-
tion of human capital, is suciently large (resp. small) to satisfy e > 
()
(resp. e  
()), then the growth-impeding quality eect dominates (resp.
is dominated by) the growth-enhancing quantity eect, and child rearing sub-
sidies n have negative (resp. non-negative) eects on the per capita GDP
growth rate.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 3, a stronger stepping-on-toes eect (i.e., a
higher value of ) expands the parameter regions in which the child rearing
subsidy policy n negatively aects the per capita GDP growth rate (i.e.,
@y
@n
< 0).23 If the stepping-on-toes eect is strong, the size of workers en-
gaged in the R&D sector has little eect on new variety expansion because
the benet of R&D eorts by large numbers of researchers is oset by the
increased duplication of research eorts. In particular, from (34), if the
stepping-on-toes eect is extremely strong (i.e.,  = 1), the growth rates of
either the population as a whole or the number of researchers in particu-
lar (n) will have no positive eect on the per capita GDP growth rate, and
the growth-enhancing quantity eect will become negligible. Therefore, if
the stepping-on-toes eect is strong, the growth-impeding quality eect will
dominate the growth-enhancing quantity eect, and a child rearing subsidy
n will negatively aect the per capita GDP growth rate.
These results indicate that the eect of a child education subsidy on
growth is always positive, whereas the eect of a child rearing subsidy on
23From the denition of 
(), analogous to the eect of , a higher elasticity of sub-
stitution among intermediate goods (") and a lower intensity of intermediate goods in
the nal goods sector () will enlarge the parameter regions in which the relationship
@y
@n
< 0 holds. Both higher " and lower  induce smaller monopoly prots for interme-
diate good rms, reduce the product variety growth rate in the R&D sector, and weaken
the growth-enhancing quantity eect of child rearing subsidy policies.
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growth can be negative in an environment in which either the strength of the
stepping-on-toes eect is large or parental educational investment is critical
for the accumulation of human capital. Thus, even in an R&D-based growth
model in which population growth positively aects long-run growth through
its quantity eect, a child rearing subsidy policy (i.e., a pro-natal policy)
cannot be justied as a growth-enhancing policy.
4.2 Welfare eects
In this subsection, we examine the welfare eect of a child education subsidy
policy. To avoid lexicographic explanations, we focus our analysis on the child
education subsidy policy (i.e., e > 0 and n = 0). We consider the following
policy experiment. Initially, we assume that the economy is in a steady-
state equilibrium with no child education subsidy policy (i.e., e;t = 0 for all
t < k ). Then, in period k, a child education subsidy policy is introduced for
young adult individuals in generation k and subsequent generations t  k.
For simplicity, we assume that the government establishes the subsidy rate
e;t as a xed value e in period k and that this value remains constant at e
for all t  k (i.e., e;t = e for all t  k).
Using (1), (3), (4), (5), (36)-(40), and n = 0, the lifetime utility level of
individuals in generation t, ut, is written as follows:
ut(wt; Rt+1; ht 1; e;t)  (1  ) ln c1;t(wt; ht 1; e;t)
+ (1  ) ln c2;t+1(wt; Rt+1; ht 1; e;t)
+  [ ln e(e;t) + lnn] ;
(41)
where
c1;t(wt; ht 1; e;t)  1  
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +  [1  (e;t)]wth(ht 1; e;t);
c2;t+1(wt; Rt+1; ht 1; e;t)  1  
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) + Rt+1[1  (e;t)]wth(ht 1; e;t);
(e;t)  
(1  )(1 + )
e;t
1  e;t ;
e(e;t)  1
1  e;t
z
1  ;
h(ht 1; e;t)  Eht 1[e(e;t)]emm ;
n  1
z
(1  )
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +  ;
m  m(1  )(1 + )
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +  :
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Furthermore, as detailed in Appendix F, the equilibrium wage rate wt and
the interest rate Rt are determined by the following equations:
wt = A
1 "
"

t ; (42)
Rt+1 =
dt+1 + Vt+1
Vt
; (43)
where
dt =
(1  ")
1   + "A
1 "
"
 1
t

1  
1 + 
gA;t
1 + gA;t

Ht;
Vt =
stNt
At+1
=
A
1 "
"
 1
t
1 + gA;t

1 + 
Ht;
  "(1  )1 , Ht  ht`tNt and gA;t  At+1 AtAt .
A child education subsidy policy aects the lifetime utility level of in-
dividuals through three channels: the \tax-subsidy distortion eect", the
\human capital accumulation eect" and the \general equilibrium eect".
First, the tax-subsidy distortion eect is represented by the increase in e;t
in (41). Given wage wt, interest rate Rt+1 and parental human capital ht 1,
an increase in e;t increases the parental investment in education for each
child et, decreases the labor supply `t, and increases the tax burden t. Be-
cause of the well-known tax subsidy distortion eect, the latter two negative
eects always oset the initial (positive) eect. Therefore, the tax-subsidy
distortion eect represents a negative inuence on the lifetime utility levels
of individuals. Second, the human capital accumulation eect is represented
by the changes in h(e;t; ht 1) that occur in (41). A child education subsidy
policy enhances parental investments in education for each child (et) and
increases the human capital level of all subsequent generations. Therefore,
the human capital accumulation eect represents a positive inuence on the
lifetime utility levels of individuals. Finally, the general equilibrium eect is
represented by the changes in the wage rate (wt) and the interest rate (Rt)
that appear in (41). Unfortunately, it is dicult to analytically investigate
the inuence of the general equilibrium eect. As a result, this subsection
provides only numerical examples.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the net lifetime utility gains of individuals who
belong to generations 17{25 (9 generations) and describes how the lifetime
utility levels of these individuals are aected by the child education subsidy
policy implemented from period 20. Thus, we set k = 20 in our numerical
analysis. The parameters used in the base-case simulation are described in
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footnote 14 and explained in Appendix E. The solid line represents e = 0,
and the broken and dotted lines show the dierences between e = 0:03, 0:06
and 0, respectively.
As shown in Figure 4-1, a child education subsidy policy lowers the life-
time utility levels of individuals in generation 19 but raises the lifetime utility
levels of individuals in all subsequent generations for t  20. This result im-
plies that there is an intergenerational conict between current and future
generations with respect to child education subsidy policies. Figures 4-2 to
4-4 help us understand the intuition underlying this result. Figure 4-2 reveals
the net dierences in the human capital levels of individuals who belong to
generations 17 to 25, whereas Figures 4-3 and 4-4 illustrate the net dier-
ences in wage rate (wt) and interest rate (Rt) from period 17 to period 25.
Thus, Figure 4-2 represents the human capital accumulation eect, whereas
Figures 4-3 and 4-4 represent the general equilibrium eect.
The decline in interest rate Rt that occurs during period 20 (see Figure
4-4) reduces the lifetime utility level of the individuals in generation 19 be-
cause it decreases their interest income during their old age.24 However, the
increase in the interest rate during period 21 (see Figure 4-4) improves the
lifetime utility level of individuals in generation 20 by osetting the negative
tax-subsidy distortion eect of the child education subsidy policy.25
The child education subsidy policy implemented from period 20 leads to
the higher human capital level of individuals in generation t  21 (see Figure
4-2). Although the decline in wage rate in period 21 (see Figure 4-3) and
the tax-subsidy distortion eect negatively aect the lifetime utility levels of
individuals in generation 21, the increase in the interest rate during period
22 and the positive human capital accumulation eect oset these negative
eects and improve the lifetime utility levels of individuals in generation 21.
As shown in Figure 4-2, the inuence of the human capital accumula-
tion eect becomes larger over time because higher human capital levels of
previous generations result in higher human capital levels for subsequent gen-
erations (i.e., intergenerational spillover eects via human capital production
functions). Furthermore, based on (24), (27) and (42), the acceleration of
24Figures 4-3 and 4-4 indicate that the child education subsidy policy implemented from
period 20 induces short-run uctuations in the wage rate (wt) and interest rate (Rt). The
mechanisms underlying this short-run uctuation are slightly complicated and are dicult
to briey explain. Therefore, we delegate this explanation to Appendix G for readers who
are concerned with this issue.
25The child education subsidy policy implemented from period 20 aects neither the
human capital levels nor the wage rates of individuals in generations 19 and 20. In addition,
individuals in generation 19 do not suer from the tax-subsidy distortion eect, because
the child education subsidy policy has not yet been implemented at the time that these
individuals are young adults.
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human capital accumulation from period 20 leads to the higher growth rate
of aggregate human capital Ht, product variety At and wage rate wt in period
21 and subsequent periods. Therefore, in the long run, the positive human
capital accumulation eect, and accompanying rapid increases in wages oset
other negative eects, and improve the lifetime utility levels of individuals in
generations t  22.26
The above numerical simulation results suggest that a child education
subsidy policy greatly improves the welfare of future generations, whereas the
benets that current generations obtain are relatively small. In particular,
child education subsidy policy may produce immediate reductions in the
welfare of old individuals when the policy is implemented. These results
suggest that the real-world expansion of a child education subsidy may be
politically challenging because it impairs the welfare of elderly individuals
or individuals who possess great political power at the time that this policy
goes into eect. Therefore, the expansion of a child education subsidy policy
may be politically unpopular and dicult for politicians to implement.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper constructed a simple overlapping generations version of an R&D-
based growth model a la Diamond (1965) and Jones (1995). This model
was used to examine how an increase in old-age survival probability impacts
purposeful R&D investment and long-run growth by aecting fertility and
education decisions. We demonstrated that under conditions involving rela-
tively low (high) old-age survival probabilities, an increase in this probability
can positively (negatively) aect economic growth. This paper also compared
the growth implications of child education subsidy policies and child rearing
subsidy policies and demonstrated that although child education subsidies
always foster economic growth, child rearing subsidies may reduce economic
growth under certain conditions. Finally, we considered the eects of a child
education subsidy on welfare levels. We found that there exists an inter-
generational conict between current and future generations with respect to
public policies that govern child education.
26In the long run, the interest rate Rt gradually converges to a value that is lower
than its original steady-state value. Thus, this decline in the interest rate (Rt) and the
tax subsidy-distortion eect negatively aect the lifetime utility levels of individuals in
generations t  22.
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Appendix A: The market-clearing condition for
assets
Due to the perfect competition in the nal goods market, the value of nal
good output is expressed as follows:
Yt = wtHY;t + Atptxt:
Thus, using the prots of intermediate good rms dt = (pt  wt)xt, (21) and
(22), the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
Yt = wt (Ht  HA;t) + At (Vt 1Rt   Vt) :
Therefore, the market-clearing condition for nal goods is expressed in the
following manner:
wt (Ht  HA;t) + At (Vt 1Rt   Vt) = c1;tNt + c2;tNt 1:
In the case of Vtt = wt, HA;t > 0 and At+1 > At
With respect to (20), consider the case of Vtt = wt in which the R&D sector
functions; HA;t > 0; and At+1 > At. By substituting (2), (3), (18), Vtt = wt
and Ht  ht`tNt into the market-clearing condition for nal goods, we obtain
the following expression:
stNt   VtAt+1 = Rt (st 1Nt 1   Vt 1At) :
Because initial assets are given by s 1N 1 = V 1A0, we can obtain (23) for
any period t > 0.
In the case of Vtt < wt, HA;t = 0 and At+1 = At
With respect to (20), consider the case of Vtt < wt in which R&D sector does
not function; HA;t = 0; and At+1 = At. By substituting (2), (3), HA;t = 0
and Ht  ht`tNt into the market-clearing condition for nal goods, we obtain
the following expression:
stNt   VtAt = Rt (st 1Nt 1   Vt 1At) :
Because the initial assets are given by s 1N 1 = V 1A0, we obtain the fol-
lowing asset market equilibrium condition:
VtAt = stNt; for Vtt < wt: (44)
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Appendix B: The non-existence of HA;t = 0 at
equilibrium
From (20), the case of HA;t = 0 occurs only if Vtt < wt. In this appendix,
we demonstrate that the relationships Vtt < wt and HA;t = 0 cannot simul-
taneously hold under market equilibrium conditions.
Suppose that HA;t = 0; as shown in Appendix A, we then obtain the fol-
lowing asset market equilibrium condition: VtAt = stNt. Here, note that this
condition is derived without explicitly relying on the information that Vtt <
wt. Thus, by substituting (6), Ht  ht`tNt and `t = (1 )(1+)(1 )(1+m)(1+)+  `
into VtAt = stNt, the stock value (Vt) that is consistent with market equilib-
rium conditions can be rewritten as follows:
Vt =

1 + 
wtHt
At
:
Hence, using (19) and Vt =

1+
wtHt
At
, the condition Vtt < wt can be rewritten
as follows:

1 + 
A  1t Ht < H

A;t:
However, because 
1+
A  1t Ht > 0, the above inequality never holds if
HA;t = 0. Therefore, the relationships of Vtt < wt and HA;t = 0 cannot
simultaneously hold under market equilibrium conditions.
Appendix C: The derivation of per capita GDP
in (32)
We derive per capita GDP in (32). By substituting (13), (14) andXt = A
1="
t xt
into (16), we obtain the following equation:
HY;t
Atxt
=
1  
"
: (45)
Using (45), GDP in (31) can be expressed as follows:
Yt = A
1 "
"

t

HY;t
Atxt
1 
Atxt = A
1 "
"

t

1  
"
1 
Atxt: (46)
Furthermore, by substituting (45) into (22), we obtain the following expres-
sion:
Atxt =
"
1   + " (Ht  HA;t) : (47)
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Thus, by substituting (47) into (46), GDP can be rewritten as follows:
Yt =
"(1  )1 
1  + " A
1 "
"

t

1  HA;t
Ht

Ht: (48)
Finally, using (18), (19) and (25),
HA;t
Ht
can be expressed as follows:
HA;t
Ht
=

1 + 
gA;t
1 + gA;t
: (49)
Thus, by substituting (49) into (48), and dividing it by the young adult
population size (Nt), we obtain (32).
Appendix D: The derivations of (35) and Propo-
sition 2-2
The derivation of (35)
From (34), we obtain the following expression:
ln(1 + gy) =

1 +
1  
1   
1  "
"


(lnEee + m lnm) +
1  
1   
1  "
"
 lnn:
(50)
Then, by dierentiating (50) with respect to , we obtain the following result:
1
1 + gy
@gy
@
=

1 +
1  
1   
1  "
"


m
m
@m
@
+
1  
1   
1  "
"

1
n
@n
@
: (51)
From (7) and (9), the following relationships must hold.
1
m
dm
d
=
1
[(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) + ]

1 + 
;
1
n
@n
@
=   (1  )(1 + m)
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +  :
Thus, by substituting the above two equations into (51), we obtain the fol-
lowing equation:
@gy
@
=
1 + gy
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +  
1 +
1  
1   
1  "
"


m
1 + 
  1  
1   
1  "
"
(1  )(1 + m)

:
By rearranging the above equation, we obtain (35).
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The derivation of Proposition 2-2
By dierentiating log GDP per capita with respect to n, we obtain the
following expression:
1
1 + gy
@gy
@n
=

1 +
1  
1   
1  "
"


e
e
@e
@n
+
1  
1   
1  "
"

1
n
@n
@n
: (52)
From (39) and (40), the following relationships must hold:
1
e
@e
@n
=   1
1  n ;
1
n
@n
@n
=
1
1  n :
Thus, by substituting the above two equations into (52) and rearranging the
result, we obtain the following expression:
@gy
@n
=  1 + gy
1  n

1 +
1  
1   
1  "
"


e   (1  )(1  ")
(1  )(1  ") + (1   )"

:
Appendix E: The parameters for the simula-
tion
According to Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005), labor's share in output in US
is approximately 0.6, and markup estimates in US industry range between
1.05 and 1.40. Based on these estimates, the share of intermediate good
inputs in output () is set to 0.4, and the substitution parameter () is
set to 0.83. Furthermore, in accordance with the example of Strulik et al.
(2011), we set the standing-on-shoulders eect parameter ( ) to 0.5 and the
stepping-on-toes eect parameter () to 0.2. We also normalize the scaling
parameter of R&D production () to 10.
Because there is little evidence regarding the values of parameters for
the relative utility weights that are allocated to children or to the quality of
children (, ), the human capital production function (E, e, m) and the
time cost of child bearing (z), we choose these values in ways that produce
plausible per capita GDP growth and population growth. In particular, we
chose 0.3 and 0.7 as the values of  and , respectively. The values of e and
m are established at 0.25 and 0.75, respectively. To achieve a 2 % balanced
per capita GDP growth rate at an old-age survival probability () of 1, we
adjust the value of E to E = 6:0675. Further, to achieve a 0 % population
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growth rate if the old-age survival probability () is 1, we adjusted the value
of z to z = (1 )
2(1 )(1+m)+ .
To investigate the eect of an increase in old-age survival probability,
we set the value of , the old-age survival probability, to 1 in the base-case
simulation and increase  from 0.1 to 1 in increments of 0.1. In addition,
to investigate the eect of a child education subsidy policy, we set the value
of e, the child education subsidy rate, at 0 in the base-case simulation and
alter it from 0 to 0.06 in increments of 0.03.
Appendix F: The derivations of (42) and (43)
The derivation of the wage rate in (42)
First, we derive the wage rate in (42). By substituting Xt = A
1="
t xt into (13),
we obtain the following expression:
wt = (1  )H Y;t

A
1="
t xt

= (1  )

Atxt
HY;t

A
1 "
"

t : (53)
Finally, by substituting (45) into (53), we obtain (42).
The derivation of the interest rate in (43)
Next, we derive the interest rate in (43). By substituting (16), (42), (47),
and (49) into (17), we obtain the following expression:
dt =
(1  ")
1   + "A
1 "
"
 1
t

1  
1 + 
gA;t
1 + gA;t

Ht: (54)
Using (4), (9), (39), (40) and (e;t) in (41), the labor supply under a child
education subsidy policy is therefore be expressed as follows:
`t =
(1  )(1 + )(1  t)
(1  )(1 + m)(1 + ) +  : (55)
Thus, by substituting (38), (42), (55) and Ht = ht`tNt into (23), we obtain
the following equation:
Vt =
stNt
At+1
=
A
1 "
"
 1
t
1 + gA;t

1 + 
Ht: (56)
Finally, by substituting (54) and (56) into (21), we obtain (43).
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Appendix G: Supplementary explanation for
Figure 4-3 and 4-4
The eect of child education subsidy on wage rate wt in
Figure 4-3
The eect of a child education subsidy on the wage rate wt is explained
as follows. The child education subsidy policy implemented from period
20 increases parental investment in education for each child et in period
t  20 but decreases the labor supply `t in period t  20. From (27) and
Ht  ht`tNt, the decline in the labor supply `t during period 20 negatively
aects the aggregate human capital (Ht) that is accumulated between periods
19 and 20, lowering the growth rate of product variety (At) between periods
20 and 21. Note that the wage rate (wt) is given by wt = A
1 "
"

t from
(42). Thus, as shown in Figure 4-3, the wage rate wt during period 21
decreases due to the child education subsidy policy. However, the increase
in parental investment in education for each child (et) that occurs during
periods t  20 positively aects the aggregate human capital (Ht) that is
accumulated during periods t  20, increasing the growth rate of product
variety At during periods t  21. Consequently, the wage rate (wt) during
periods t  23 increases greatly because of the child education subsidy policy.
The eect of a child education subsidy on interest rate
Rt in Figure 4-4
By substituting (54) and (56) into (21), we obtain the following expression:
Rt = (1 + gA;t 1)
1 "
"


Ht
Ht 1

(1  ")
1   + "

1

+
1
(1  ")
1
1 + gA;t

: (57)
Thus, we can conrm that interest rate (Rt) is aected by the growth rate
of product variety (At) and by aggregate human capital (Ht) in several com-
plicated ways. By considering (57), the eect of the child education subsidy
on the interest rate Rt may be explained as follows. From (27), (57), and
Ht  ht`tNt, the decline in the labor supply (`t) during period 20 decreases
the growth rate of aggregate human capital (Ht) between periods 19 and 20,
which induces a decline in the interest rate (Rt) during period 20. However,
the increase in the parental investment in education for each child (et) in
periods t  20 increases the growth rate of aggregate human capital (Ht)
between periods 20 and 21, which induces an increase in the interest rate
35
(Rt) during period 21. After period 21, short-run uctuation ceases, and
the interest rate (Rt) gradually converges to a new steady-state value that is
lower than the original steady-state value.
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Table1 Total fertility rate, Life expectancy and population growth for G-7 countries 
Country Total Fertility Life Expectancy at Birth Population Growth Rate
 1960-1965 2005-2010 1960 2005 1960-1965 2005-2010
Canada 3.57 1.64 71.1 80.3 1.95 1.07
France 2.87 1.99 69.9 80.1 1.30 0.62
Germany 2.47 1.36 69.6 78.9 0.84 -0.15
Italy 2.53 1.38 69.1 80.6 0.96 0.65
Japan 2.05 1.34 67.7 81.9 1.26 -0.04
United Kingdom 2.84 1.89 71.1 79.0 0.67 0.65
United States 3.36 2.08 69.8 77.3 1.50 0.92
Source: World Bank (2012) 
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Table2 Change in level of Education   
 Percentage of Adult Population with 
 Average Years of 
Schooling 
Complete 
Secondary
Education 
Complete Higher 
Education 
Advanced 
Countries 
1975 8.0 34.9 8.0 
2010 11.0 63.9 16.6 
Source: Weil (2012). Table 6-1, and Barro and Lee (2010). Data for population 25
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Figure 1: The parameter regions of (; ) where Proposition 1-(1), 1-(2) and
1-(3) hold
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Figure 2: Growth eect of old-age survival probability
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Figure 4: Welfare eect of child education subsidy policy
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